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Abstract: This study is concerned with the reliability of biometric veriﬁcation systems when used in forensic applications. In
particular, when such systems are subjected to targeted impersonation attacks. The authors expand on the existing work in
targeted impersonation, focusing on how best to measure the reliability of veriﬁcation systems in forensic contexts. It
identiﬁes two scenarios in which targeted impersonation effects may occur: (i) the forensic investigation of criminal activity
involving identity theft; and (ii) implicit targeting as a result of the forensic investigation process. Also, the ﬁrst partial
countermeasure to such attacks is presented. The countermeasure uses client-speciﬁc Z-score normalisation to provide a more
consistent false acceptance rate across all enrolled subjects. This reduces the effectiveness of targeted impersonation without
impairing the systems accuracy under random zero-effort attacks.1 Introduction
Biometric veriﬁcation systems validate a user’s claimed
identity by comparing a stored biometric signature against
their presented biometric features. Identiﬁcation can be
based on any physical features, with common examples
including the face, ﬁngerprints and the iris [1]. Such
systems are commonly used to control access to secure
areas of a building or complex but can also be used in
criminal investigations to compare suspects to biometric
signatures obtained at a crime scene. Currently, DNA and
ﬁngerprints are the most common sources of biometric
evidence [2], but other forms of signature are also possible,
such as facial images from CCTV recordings.
An automated biometric system is a valuable tool for
criminal investigations and there are now commercial
systems in regular use [3]. One difﬁculty, however, is the
reliability of such systems. No veriﬁcation process is
perfect, and so may fail to discover a match (false negative)
or report a match incorrectly (false positive). This paper is
concerned with two situations in forensics that signiﬁcantly
increase the chances of false positives being reported. One
is targeted biometric impersonation [4] and the other is as a
result of individuals being preselected for assessment.
Targeted biometric impersonation involves locating an
innocent person in the veriﬁcation system with a similar
biometric signature and then fraudulently assuming that
identity to spoof a veriﬁcation check. This would be an
attack by determined and sophisticated criminals.
Unfortunately, in routine forensic investigations, the same
situation is created inadvertently when someone is selected
for a veriﬁcation check based on initial identiﬁcation from,say, CCTV images or a photo-ﬁt description. The reliability
of the veriﬁcation produced by the system is closer to that
of a targeted attack, as the suspect has not been selected
randomly from the population.
It should be noted that, although there has been signiﬁcant
research towards providing a statistical basis for validating
forensic evidence, it is generally accepted that forensic
examiners cannot provide certainty of veriﬁcation. Their
role is instead to provide expert comparison of forensic
evidence. However, in order for automated biometric
systems to provide useful information to a forensic
examiner, their performance must be communicated in an
understandable way. As such, it is important to ensure
biometric veriﬁcation systems are assessed in the likely
context of their use, including the potential reduction in
accuracy caused by targeted attacks.
Targeted impersonation was ﬁrst introduced as a method of
spooﬁng gait veriﬁcation systems [5]. A recent conference
paper has shown that this attack is also effective against
face veriﬁcation [4]. This paper is an expansion of that
publication. It examines in more detail the context under
which such attacks can occur and introduces the ﬁrst
countermeasure to reduce the effectiveness of targeted
attacks.
The paper starts by surveying the existing literature on the
measurement of biometric vulnerabilities. It then expands
upon the two contexts in which targeted impersonation can
be an issue for forensic investigations: deliberate targeted
biometric impersonation and implicit targeting within a
criminal investigation. The paper also discusses the
similarities that exist between biometric menagerie effects
and targeted impersonation. It then examines the effect of55
& The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2014
www.ietdl.org
targeted spooﬁng on an example face veriﬁcation system. The
investigation uses a publicly available biometric algorithm
and data set. The paper then analyses how the effectiveness
of such attacks increases with the number of potential
targets. It concludes by describing the countermeasure and
an additional metric for assessing veriﬁcation performance.2 Biometric vulnerabilities
Technology evaluations of biometric systems primarily
measure veriﬁcation performance using the false rejection
and false acceptance rates of the system under test with
different trade-off priorities [6].
Many contextual factors, such as facial pose and lighting,
can have a signiﬁcant effect on veriﬁcation performance
and, as the various biometrics have matured, these factors
have been investigated [7]. More recently, deliberate
attempts to attack biometric systems have been studied.
Uludag and Jain [8] have identiﬁed eight different types of
attack based on the part of the biometric system being
subverted. The ﬁrst of these types focuses on attacks aimed
at the sensor. These attacks are the focus of this paper. The
remaining types are attacks on the electronic systems and
enrolment procedures used to set up and perform veriﬁcation.
In terms of sensor-level attacks, three existing methods
have been identiﬁed [9]:
† Zero-effort attacks, in which a person claims a random
identity and attempts to be incorrectly accepted by the
system. Zero-effort attacks are the attack type being
measured in existing large-scale performance evaluations
that calculate false accept rates.
† Brute force attacks, which repeatedly attempt to access a
system, adjusting a biometric feature until a sufﬁciently
close match is obtained [10]. Such attacks generally require
unrestricted access to the biometric system (e.g. picking a
biometric lock on a stolen laptop). Secure access control
scenarios, such as passport control at an airport, make such
attacks less feasible as access failures can raise alarms.
† Artefact attacks, which use a synthetic biometric feature
that has been produced from a genuine user. Such attacks
would also cover the attempted use of a surgically removed
biometric features and methods which exploit residual
features on a sensor [11].
An additional consideration is that not all the users of a
system will necessarily have the same level of security.
This was highlighted by Doddington and co-workers [12],
who measured the relative recognisability of different users
of a speaker recognition system. Here, the users were
classiﬁed into four different types: sheep who have normal
performance, goats who are difﬁcult to recognise, lambs
who are easy to impersonate and wolves who can easily
impersonate others. Attackers can exploit this variation to
compromise a biometric system. For example, a lamb
insertion attack [9] would involve deliberately enrolling a
person or synthetic feature that is known to have a similar
signature to many subjects. The system containing the lamb
subject would then be vulnerable to imposters claiming the
lamb identity.
By deliberately selecting a legitimate user with similar
biometric features, a targeted attack can enable imposters to
greatly increase their chances of false acceptance. Targeted
attacks are a signiﬁcant vulnerability as they have no
artiﬁcial traits that can be recognised, either by an56
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possible without control over the enrolment procedure or
the need for a confederate whose true identity would be
made known, as is the case for twin impersonation or lamb
injection attacks. Such attacks are also quite likely, as they
are a plausible strategy for even relatively unsophisticated
attackers.
2.1 Deliberate targeted biometric impersonation
In January 2010, Al-Mabhouh, co-founder of the military
wing of Hamas, was assassinated in Dubai. According to
Dubai’s authorities, there were up to 29 suspects, 12 of
whom carried British passports, six Irish, four French, one
German, four Australian and two Palestinian. Interpol and
the Dubai police believe that the suspects stole the identities
of real people [13]. This example highlights the risk that
sophisticated attackers can undermine existing identiﬁcation
systems by targeting individuals for impersonation.
Increase in the use of social networking, online dating and
centralised biometric databases have made identity systems
more vulnerable to targeted attacks. These large searchable
collections of face and other biometric data increase the
chance of ﬁnding a target that has a closely matching
biometric signature. Such attacks are particularly dangerous
as they can be effective both against automated biometrics
and manual methods of identiﬁcation, such as visual
passport inspection.
2.2 Implicit targeting within forensic investigations
As a result of the use of forensic investigation within popular
entertainment, jurors now expect greater forensic evidence as
the basis for criminal convictions [14]. However, such
evidence can be problematic if the chances of a false match
are high. In practice, because the prior probabilities are not
known, forensic experts do not make direct false match
claims. However, in order to provide meaningful
judgement, even informally, the reliability of forensic
approaches needs to be understood. Automated biometric
systems offer the potential for a formal and repeatable
approach to forensic comparison. However, the false
acceptance rates of such systems are typically analysed
within controlled academic studies that fail to capture the
context of a criminal investigation. In particular, biometric
veriﬁcation evaluations implicitly assume that comparisons
between different subjects would result from a random
pairing of individuals from a population. In practice, if the
basis for the comparison is transparent to investigators, the
subject pairs would have been preselected because they
appear visually similar. For example, such preselection
would occur in the case where a suspect’s face is being
compared to CCTV footage of a person committing a
crime. In this case, the reliability of such a match is
affected by both the chance of false acceptance due to the
investigators judgment and the chance of false acceptance
due to the automated system verifying a subject that had
been targeted as a similar match. This means that a targeted
false acceptance metric provides a more conservative and
more realistic measurement of matching accuracy than
traditional false acceptance measures.
2.3 Targeted impersonation and menagerie effects
Targeted impersonation can be considered as a generalisation
of biometric menagerie effects. Biometric menageries classifyIET Biom., 2014, Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 55–61
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individuals according to how similar they are to the
population as a whole and how much variation they have in
their own appearance. In contrast, targeted impersonation
highlights whether certain groups or pairs of individuals are
similar. Such similarity can occur because of menagerie
effects but can also be a result of minority groups having
high levels of similarity while remaining relatively different
from the population as a whole. For example, the facial
veriﬁcation targeted false acceptance rate of a population
made up of identical twins is likely to be extremely high.
The same population examined for menagerie effects or
with a traditional zero-effort false acceptance rate may well
show relatively low error rates as each individual may be
relatively distinct from all the non-twin subjects. Similar
differences could occur with minority racial groups within a
population. Each member of such a group may be easily
distinguishable from members of other groups but relatively
hard to distinguish from their own. Under a targeted
impersonation evaluation, false acceptance rates could be
relatively high as imposters only select targets from their
own racial demographics group. However, traditional
evaluations and menagerie classiﬁcations could conceal this
vulnerability because they measure similarity against the
population as a whole.
3 Impact evaluation
This section evaluates the effects of targeted attacks on the
CSU baseline algorithm developed by Bolme et al. [15] for
the good, the bad and the ugly face recognition challenge
[16]. The system has been trained using images from the
NIST multiple biometric grand challenge data set [17]. The
veriﬁcation system has partial robustness to lighting
variation, expression changes and occlusions. However, its
performance is much lower than that has been demonstrated
with state-of-the-art commercial face veriﬁcation algorithms
[18]. The system was evaluated using the colour FERET
face database, which has been available since 1996. The
frontal face subset, consisting of ﬁles labelled Fa and Fb,
has been selected as it is more representative of relatively
controlled face veriﬁcation recordings and is consistent with
the original FERET veriﬁcation testing protocol [19]. The
data set is made up of 1009 subjects of varying age, sex
and race. The evaluation assumes the attacker has complete
access to the gallery of subjects and the veriﬁcation
algorithms used by the system. In each case, half of the
recordings of each subject are randomly selected and used
as the gallery to which the attacker has access.
Target selection can be deﬁned as follows
xtarget(a) [ E, ∀y [ E, Ams(ES(y), AS(a))
, Ams ES(xtarget), AS(a)
( )
(1)
where xtarget is the identity of the target that is chosen by
attacker a, E is the set of enrolled subjects, AS(x) is the set
of biometric signatures that the attacker x can use for target
selection, ES(x) is the set of enrolled samples associated
with subject x and Ams(X, Y ) is the average match score
value produced by all combinations of biometric signatures
from the sets X and Y.
Each subject in the gallery takes the role of an attacker. In
each case, the gallery data is analysed to select a target that the
attacker will impersonate. In all of the targeted attacks, a
target was chosen based on the best match score value ofIET Biom., 2014, Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 55–61
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recordings within the gallery. The non-gallery recordings of
the target are then compared against the attacker to
determine imposter scores. Score values are also calculated
for all the true matching pairs of users of the system. These
score values are used to produce detection error tradeoff
(DET) curves showing the trade-off of false accept and
false reject rates for different veriﬁcation thresholds. A
traditional zero-effort DET curve is also produced to show
the relative effect of targeted attacks. The curve is
calculated by comparing each of the excluded recordings
against each of the gallery recordings to produce a range of
scores for both legitimate and zero-effort attacks. Examples
of enrolled subjects and their attackers can be seen in
Fig. 1. In most of the cases, the age, sex and race of the
subject is a good match given the size of the database.
However, it can be seen in the bottom right example that if
face shapes are close, these factors may differ signiﬁcantly.
It is expected that real deployments may have more
challenging input data and in turn may have more
sophisticated veriﬁcation systems; however, the experiments
indicate that the relative effect of targeting is sufﬁcient to
warrant further investigation.
Fig. 2 shows the baseline zero-effort attack DET curve and
the false acceptance rates when targeting is applied at the
baseline equal error rate (EER) threshold value. The EER of
the baseline is 17%. However, when a targeted attack is
performed on the same system, the false acceptance rate
rises to 51%, three times the original value and a signiﬁcant
security risk. If the threshold of the system is selected with
the knowledge of targeted attacks, the EER becomes 28%,
which reduces the risk but increases the false reject rate to
an impractical level.3.1 Number of targets
In the baseline experiments, the number of targets available to
the attacker is necessarily restricted by the size of the data
sets. The size of these data sets is consistent with the
number of subjects that might access a secure ofﬁce
environment but is much lower than many important
identity scenarios such as passport control. To analyse the
effect of increasing target numbers, further experiments
were performed using the face veriﬁcation system. The
modelling procedure is described in Algorithm 1, which is
included in Appendix 1. 800 gallery subsets of increasing
size were created. These subsets were used in the selection
of targets for evaluation. To minimise any potential bias
caused by subset selection, for a given size, all
non-overlapping subsets within the ﬁrst 800 subjects were
combined to produce median false accept rates across the
different subsets. This ensures that a subset size of 1 is
virtually identical to the baseline performance. All gallery
members took the role of attackers using the subset to
generate the imposter scores.
Fig. 3 indicates how the false accept rate increases as the
size of the target subset increases. The graph shows the
false acceptance rate for a threshold that achieves the equal
error rate of the baseline system under zero-effort attacks.
This is a plausible threshold for systems that are unaware of
the risks of targeted attacks. As the number of available
targets increases, the number of possible subsets decreases,
increasing the error in the measured false accept rate. Much
of the curve, however, conforms reasonably well to a least
squares ﬁt of an alog(x) + b model, with a = 5.1 and b = 17.8.57
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Fig. 1 Examples of enrolled subjects and their attackers
Each attacker is to the right of the enrolled subject
www.ietdl.orgOne difﬁculty in using a logarithmic ﬁt to predict false
acceptance rate (FAR) is that such a curve can produce values
below 0% and above 100%. Although the FAR values are
limited in this way, the difference between individual
biometric signatures may not be. There are many different
score distributions that could produce 0% or 100% FAR
values based on the relative difference between legitimate and
imposter score values. As such, the logarithmic ﬁt can be
seen as expressing the functional shift in the differenceFig. 2 Effects of a targeted attack on the CSU face veriﬁcation
algorithm
Baseline shows the performance of the system under a zero-effort attack.
Targeted shows the increase under targeted biometric attacks
58
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than the FAR value itself. As the FAR measurements
approach the bounds, excessively distant or close score values
will have a diminished effect on the measured FAR.
One way to understand this effect is to treat the
logarithmic prediction as the centre of a probability
distribution over FAR values that can pass outside the
bounds. This probability distribution reﬂects the likelihood
of obtaining any particular FAR when the biometric
system is evaluated. When determining the likelihood of
100% or 0% FAR values, the entire probability
distribution outside of the bounds are combined. In
practice, this means that when the targeted FAR value
reaches 100%, the model predicts that there is a 50%
chance of obtaining 100% FAR for any given evaluation
of the system. Further research is required to determineFig. 3 Effect of target numbers on FAR with a veriﬁcation
threshold set at the EER of the baseline system
IET Biom., 2014, Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 55–61
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Fig. 4 Effects of a Z-score normalisation to a targeted attack on
the CSU face veriﬁcation algorithm
Baseline shows the performance of the system under a zero-effort attack.
Targeted shows the increase under targeted biometric attacks.
ZNorm_Baseline shows the performance of the system under a zero-effort
attack when Z-score normalisation is applied. ZNorm_Targeted shows the
reduction in the effect of targeted attacks when the normalisation is applied
www.ietdl.org
the shape of this distribution and to validate these
predictions on systems which reach these bounds. It
should be noted that this differs from typical model
estimates which predict the mean FAR value. In this case,
the modelled FAR value is the value of the median of the
predicted measured scores and is thus not altered by the
clamping effects of samples above or below this median
measurement. In particular, 100% predicted FAR can
occur when there are targets who have a small range of
appearance variation centred on the enrolled data for each
subject and thus entirely reside within the bounds needed
to achieve the FRR of the system. However, it should be
noted that larger evaluations are needed to conﬁrm the
accuracy of the model as it reaches 0 or 100% values.
An additional consideration is how feasible is it for
attackers to obtain information about the gallery subjects
and the system being attacked. For small-scale
deployments, surveillance may be sufﬁcient to establish
possible targets. However, some biometrics may be more
vulnerable. For example, face, voice and gait are relatively
easy to record at a distance while ﬁngerprint, iris and ﬁnger
vein may require more elaborate social engineering to
obtain. For identity applications with a large number of
users, such as passports, public information may be
sufﬁcient. For example, a number of online dating websites
have photographs of millions of users which can be
anonymously searched using soft biometric constraints
including, age, sex, race, hair colour and height [20].
Centralised databases of biometric information are of
greater concern. For example, if the US visit database was
hacked, its recordings could be used to identify possible
targets for face or ﬁngerprint attacks.4 Targeting countermeasure
Unlike many biometric attacks, targeting has no artiﬁcial
component and thus cannot be detected directly. Instead,
countermeasures must attempt to limit the false acceptance
rate of worst case false matches between enrolled subjects
and the user population. Different enrolled subjects may
have different levels of vulnerability as some subjects may
be more generic than others. When targeted attacks are
performed these, more generic subjects are more likely to
be successfully impersonated. To minimise false acceptance
rate these subjects need to have their match scores
normalised so that they correspond to the likelihood that
two subjects are the same.
The vulnerability of each enrolled subject can be estimated
by ﬁnding the closest potential target within the enrolment
database. The match score between each subject and their
target provides an estimate for the false match score of an
unknown user performing a targeted attack. By reducing a
match score by the enrolment target score, the variation in
vulnerability may be reduced. However, this assumes that
the remaining database is a reasonable estimate of the
population as a whole. Unfortunately, for relatively small
data sets, such as the FERET face database, this estimate is
insufﬁciently robust and provides negligible improvement in
overall performance. In addition, the noise in the
client-speciﬁc estimate increases the false acceptance rate of
the system under zero-effort attacks.
A more reliable estimate of client-speciﬁc vulnerability
can be obtained by approximating each enrolled subject’s
false match score distribution by a Gaussian. The mean
and standard deviation of this Gaussian can then beIET Biom., 2014, Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 55–61
doi: 10.1049/iet-bmt.2013.0054estimated using the false match scores of each subject
and all the other members of the enrolment database.
Z-score normalisation can be applied for each enrolled
subject to try to maintain similar false match performance
for each subject. The normalisation reduces match scores
by the estimated Gaussian mean and then scales scores
using the reciprocal of the standard deviation, that is,
(x − μ)/σ; where x is the unnormalised score value, μ is
the mean of the false match scores with all the other
enrolled subjects and σ is the standard deviation of these
false match scores relative to their mean. Fig. 4 shows
that Z-score normalisation is effective at partially
reducing the false acceptance rate for targeted attacks.
Normalisation reduces the FAR at the baseline EER from
51% to 42%. The normalisation also has no signiﬁcant
effect on the baseline zero-effort performance. Z-score
normalisation makes the assumption that the vulnerability
averaged over the estimated population is proportional to
the vulnerability when the subject is directly selected as a
target. For larger data sets, it may be possible to improve
on this performance by more accurately estimating
vulnerability of those subjects likely to select the enrolled
subject as a target.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyses the effect of targeted attacks that can
reduce the effectiveness of biometric identity veriﬁcation. It
has described two contexts in which targeted attack
evaluations are relevant to forensics: deliberate targeted
biometric impersonation and implicit targeting within a
criminal investigation. It has described the difference
between targeted impersonation and biometric menagerie
effects and has illustrated the problem through the59
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evaluation of a baseline face veriﬁcation algorithm. This
evaluation revealed that with 800 potential targets, attacks
can increase false acceptance rates of the measured system
by a factor of three, reducing security to the point that it is
no longer reliable for forensic comparison. Further analysis
suggests that the false acceptance rate can be estimated
using a simple model that is proportional to the logarithm
of the number of enrolled subjects. This model provides a
means to estimate the vulnerability of systems with many
users. The paper also describes the ﬁrst countermeasure to
targeted attacks. The countermeasure uses client-speciﬁc
Z-score normalisation to provide a more consistent false
acceptance rate across all enrolled subjects. When the
system’s threshold is set to the EER of the baseline
algorithm, the countermeasure reduces the relative increase
in FAR due to targeted attacks from a factor of three to a
factor of two and a half. Such score normalisation already
forms part of many commercial systems for the purpose of
dealing with varying quality levels in enrolled data and
menagerie effects across enrolled subjects. This paper has
shown that this technique is also important in mitigating
targeted attacks. In particular, as demonstrated in Fig. 4, the
normalisation has negligible effect on the zero-effort attack
performance and so the importance of this normalisation
could be missed by those implementing such a system. As
further work, it would be valuable to explore alternative
score normalisation methods to assess to what extent they
improve resilience to targeted attacks. It would also be
useful to determine the effect of targeted attacks on
state-of-the-art commercial face veriﬁcation algorithms.
Such systems have demonstrated 100% veriﬁcation
accuracy on the FERET data set [18] and many include
score normalisation methods that may help to mitigate these
attacks. Unfortunately, owing to their closed nature, it is not
possible to analyse how such systems have been trained,
and why such systems are robust or vulnerable to such
attacks. To facilitate further study into these forms of
vulnerability, it would be valuable for open
implementations of state-of-the-art biometric systems to be
made available so that more detailed and realistic
performance comparisons can be made. In addition, it
would be useful to analyse to what extent biometric systems
are vulnerable to targeted attacks when the target is selected
solely using human judgment, as this is the form of attack
that would be implicitly performed within a criminal
investigation.
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